Recapturing the North: Exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar Bear” and “Lemming,” 1945 by Halliday, Hugh A.
Canadian Military History
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 4
1-20-2012
Recapturing the North: Exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar
Bear” and “Lemming,” 1945
Hugh A. Halliday
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military
History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.
Recommended Citation
Halliday, Hugh A. (1997) "Recapturing the North: Exercises “Eskimo,” “Polar Bear” and “Lemming,” 1945," Canadian Military History:
Vol. 6 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/4
Hugh A. Halliday 
The day is past when our Armed Forces can afford to suspend operations for the 
winter months. Space is power only when we can move and fight effectively in 
that space during all seasons of the year. 
Preface to Canadian Army Report on Exercise "Eskimo."1 
One region of great interest to postwar Canadian forces was the Arctic. This was 
not a new area for them; the army and RCAF 
had been active there in the 1920s and 1930s, 
but the war had expanded the strategic and 
economic importance of the place. From the 
winter of 1941-42 onwards, the Canadian Army 
held trials of assorted cold-weather vehicles, 
specialized rations and protective clothing. This 
work proceeded at many sites, bu t most 
intensively at Camp Borden, Camp Petawawa 
and Arvida. Training of groups such as the 1st 
Special Service Force (a joint Canada/U.S. unit), 
British commandos and Free Norwegian troops 
tested some of this materiel. There were 
considerable exchanges of information and 
personnel between Canadian and American 
authorities. Simultaneously, experiences in 
assorted battle theatres were studied, including 
the Russian front and Alaska. However, the 
Canadian Army still lacked a doctrine on either 
winter or Arctic warfare. There was little 
information on how large forces using the new 
gear should be supplied and handled under 
extremely cold winter conditions. 
The Canadian Army was anxious to test 
equipment and methods which might be 
employed in the future, whether in northern 
Europe, northern Asia, or the Canadian Arctic. 
Colonel W.W. Goforth, Royal Canad ian 
Armoured Corps, was particularly interested. 
As a weapons development expert he believed 
that postwar Canada should carve out a 
specialized niche in winter warfare. His 
advocacy of this view - and his direction of the 
Winter Warfare Programme of 1944-1945 -
would earn him appointment as an Officer, 
Order of the British Empire (OBE). 
Discussion of an ambitious test program 
began within National Defence Headquarters 
as early as May 1944.2 On 27 July 1944, 
Lieutenant-General J.G. Murchie, Chief of the 
General Staff, proposed to the Minister of 
National Defence (Colonel J.L. Ralston) that 
large-scale exercises should be conducted the 
following winter. Murchie was confident that 
the vehicles and ancillary articles were now of 
the desired standards to allow men to live, move 
and fight under Arctic conditions. What was 
now needed was to ascertain the proper balance 
of arms and equipment for winter warfare, the 
mobility of forces operating beyond established 
bases and railheads, problems that might ensue 
through aerial resupply, and winter tactics 
including air/ground co-operation. The Minister 
approved the proposal on 31 July, accelerating 
planning and prepara t ion for two major 
exercises.3 
Exercise "Eskimo" 
I n J a n u a r y and February 1945 Exercise "Eskimo" was held in no r th - cen t r a l 
Saskatchewan to look at "dry cold" performance 
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(i.e. intense cold, low humidity and stable snow 
conditions). It involved land and air units and 
was a t t ended by Bri t ish and American 
observers. "Eskimo" was to determine the effect 
of a continental, sub-Arctic winter on the 
mobility and combat efficiency of all-arms 
striking forces. Equipment and winterizing aids 
developed in earlier trials, plus experience from 
Alaska, Iceland and Europe were all brought to 
bear. Wartime commitments limited personnel 
to about 1,750, all ranks, although 569 vehicles 
were used at one time or another; these 
included a Ram II tank, several 5 cwt trucks 
(better known as "Jeeps"), and assorted 
oversnow carriers. The latter included two crude 
machines (one with an air-cooled engine, the 
other a liquid-cooled power unit) officially 
designated as a "Snow Tractor, T-27," a 
precursor of the "Ski-doo." It was reported as 
having good oversnow performance bu t 
"insufficiently rugged in design." Another odd 
vehicle was the "Snow Tractor, T-36" which 
broke down after twelve miles of travel on a 
ploughed road. Other equipment tested was as 
diverse as beard clippers, goggles, and assorted 
tents.4 
The main exercise consisted of an advance 
183 miles northward of Prince Albert followed 
by a withdrawal along the same route. The 
terra in consisted of an undula t ing plain 
interspersed with lakes and muskeg. Snow 
cover averaged 18 inches. The site had been 
chosen for its mean seasonal temperature (-1° 
to -11° F); dur ing "Eskimo" the ac tua l 
temperatures varied from -34° to + 38° F. 
"Eskimo" was more to test materiel than 
men. The force was a skeletonized Brigade 
Group, small in numbers but representing all 
combat arms. The infantry component, drawn 
from the King's Own Rifles of Canada (a 
Saskatchewan unit in Canada's home army) 
was only 325 officers and men; most of the 
remaining personnel were specialists operating 
the gadgetry of war - signals, engineering, 
transport, artillery, and medical equipment. 
After the infantry, the largest single group were 
Royal Canadian Engineers (193, all ranks). 
Curiously, al though "Eskimo" equipment 
included several armoured fighting vehicles, 
these were operated by Royal Canadian Army 
Service Corps personnel; virtually no members 
of the Armoured Corps were assigned. 
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Even an exercise of this sort generated 
volumes of paper, some of it concerning 
unexpected topics. Much attention was devoted 
to assembling foreign observers; both the 
Americans and the Bri t ish were keenly 
interested in both exercises. The National Film 
Board was asked to record the proceedings. A 
memo dated 4 November 1944 declared five 
establishments as "out of bounds" to military 
personnel - the Prince Albert Breweries, three 
cafes and a designated rooming house. 
A portion of "Eskimo" entailed movement 
through Prince Albert National Park, the 
responsibility of the Department of Mines and 
Resources. A two-page agreement signed with 
tha t d e p a r t m e n t l isted n u m e r o u s ac t s 
prohibited to the army. No game was to be 
destroyed; bridges were to be reinforced if 
crossing vehicles exceeded the load capacity of 
the structures; heavy tanks would by-pass 
bridges altogether; firing live ammunition was 
limited to certain areas defined so that shells 
would fall outside the park area; no vehicles 
would be allowed on the golf course. 
Every such operation was accompanied by 
a scenario - a fictitious set of events that gave 
the appearance of a real battle and placed the 
various activities into some context. It had to 
conform to the reality of field conditions 
(including available t roops , t e r ra in and 
equipment) but otherwise it did not have to 
correspond with strategic realities. Writing of 
this "plot" began with the initial planning of the 
exercise, when it was suggested that the 
Japanese had decided to attack Siberia with a 
diversionary raid on northern Canada. By early 
1945 this had been refined and modified; the 
scenario as adopted was as dramatic as it was 
improbable: 
(a) Japanese forces, in an ambitious effort to 
divert Allied resources from the current 
campaigns in the Philippines and Burma, 
and to restore lagging morale on their 
home front, have launched a surpr ise 
amphibious and air-borne thrust through 
Alaska a n d N o r t h w e s t C a n a d a . All 
principal airfields have been seized down 
to a l ine G r a n d e Pra i r i e -McMurray . 
Relatively small advance guard airborne 
detachments are being rushed further 
south and east to interfere with Canadian-
U.S.A. counter-measures. 
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Exercise "Eskimo" (Clockwise from top left): A 
soldier outfitted with a packboard; Attack at 
Montreal Lake, SK by "O" Group, King's Own Rifles 
of Canada; A Norseman drops supplies; Norseman 
aircraft on skiis prepare for a mission; Laying line 
by snowmobile. 
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(b) On 13 January 1945 a Japanese airborne 
force of approximately one J a p a n e s e 
battalion overwhelmed the Airfield Defence 
Unit at Lac la Ronge and seized the airfield. 
Additional airborne troops are being landed. 
(c) The enemy does not enjoy air superiority 
in general but it can be expected that he 
will have local air superiority. 
Commencing in early November, Canadian forces 
had marshalled at Prince Albert, occupying the 
buildings recently vacated by No. 122 Canadian 
Army Bas ic T ra in ing Cen t re . Two m o n t h s ' 
training was anticipated to toughen the men, bu t 
this was set back as the demands of overseas 
uni ts took precedence over domestic exercises. 
Moreover, s u p p o r t services staff h a d been 
planned on the assumption that 1,175 officers 
and men would be fed and housed. As planning 
went forward, however, addit ional observers 
(American, British and Canadian) and technical 
s p e c i a l i s t s a p p e a r e d , p a c k i n g a v a i l a b l e 
accommodation until Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale, 
the overall Director of the scheme, felt compelled 
to request additional clerks, cooks and drivers 
to handle the expansion. 
As of 16 November 1944 an RCAF Army Co-
operat ion Unit was formed at Prince Albert to 
assist with Exercise "Eskimo." It was commanded 
by Squadron Leader C.H. Stover; fittingly, he was 
experienced in this type of work; as a tactical 
r e c o n n a i s s a n c e pilot overseas wi th No.414 
Squadron (Mustangs and Spitfires) he had been 
awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross in May 
1944. His pilots included at least two decorated 
combat veterans of similar army co-operation 
work overseas - Flight Lieutenants A.S. Collins 
and AT. Carlson. Like the army component, the 
RCAF unit was housed in quarters vacated by a 
training organization (No.6 Elementary Flying 
Training School, which had become redundant 
fol lowing r e d u c t i o n s i n t h e B r i t i s h 
Commonwealth Air Training Plan). The principal 
a i rcraf t u s e d w a s t he Noordyn Norseman , 
regularly operating on skiis. However, a few other 
types were added for photography and target 
towing duties; a Douglas Dakota supplied with 
its crew by the RAF was reputed to have flown in 
support of the Normandy landings the previous 
June . Other types were flown in for special duties 
such as mock attacks. 
"Eskimo" began at dawn on 16 January 1945 
with the C a n a d i a n force, spea rheaded by a 
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r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a r t y a n d r o a d b u i l d i n g 
detachments , moving north. The Brigade Group 
was commanded by Colonel D.C. Stephenson. 
In the make-believe world of "Eskimo," the 
principal force moved along Provincial Highway 
No.2, with flanking parties moving through the 
bush on either side, providing protection against 
h idden enemies. The speed of these flanking 
parties set the real pace of the exercise. Progress 
was slow. Soldiers moving on snowshoes could 
not do better than 16 miles in a day, those on 
skiis could advance 25 miles per day, and the 
speed of both was inhibited by their dragging 
t o b o g g a n s w i t h s u p p l i e s . S e v e r a l m o c k 
s k i r m i s h e s were fought wi th make-be l ieve 
o p p o n e n t s , var ious ly desc r ibed a s "enemy 
( theore t ica l ) a i r b o r n e forces" a n d "enemy 
(theoretical) ski patrols"; towed targets became 
"enemy tanks" for Canadian gunners to engage. 
Near Listen Lake, on the 29th, with night 
falling, the Brigade Group attempted to park in 
an area cleared by engineers b u t with muskeg 
not completely frozen. Several wheeled vehicles 
bogged down. To regain mobility, the remaining 
vehicles parked in the open at the edge of the 
highway. Two Norseman and one Anson aircraft 
bombed the ma in force with soot a n d flour 
bombs, scoring n u m e r o u s hi ts . The incident 
underlined the importance of tracked vehicles 
which would not have been so immobilized or 
exposed. 
As j u s t noted, RCAF aircraft played both 
"friendly" and "hostile" roles. Some machines 
were loaned by research and training elements. 
The diary of the RCAF Army Co-Operation Unit 
(dated 23 January 1945) described a particularly 
busy day as n u m e r o u s un i t s part icipated in 
diverse roles: 
V.I.P. party still at Waskesiu with "Eskimo" 
ground forces. Mitchell aircraft arrived from 
RCAF Station, Suffield, Alberta, to lay smoke 
screen for mock exercises there. Bolingbroke 
aircraft arrived from No.5 Bombing and Gunnery 
School, Dafoe, for air to ground firing exercise. 
Recce made of area with smoke screen. Photo 
recce made of attack of force "Eskimo" on 
supposed J a p positions on Montreal Lake. 
V.I.P.'s taken on trip for aerial view of Lac la 
Ronge. Ten Harvard aircraft from No. 13 Service 
Flying Training School arrived at unit for mock 
bombing run to be made for V.I.P.'s at Waskesiu. 
The attack was made at 1100 hours. Smoke 
screen was laid by B.25 [Mitchell], and then nine 
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of the Harvards from North Battleford bombed 
the "Jap" positions, using 11-pound practice 
bombs High Explosive. Drogue towing 
Bolingbroke from Dafoe then appeared and 
artillery shoot was carried out by light Anti-
Aircraft, at the drogue towed by Bolingbroke.5 
At least one tactical innovation was tried 
when two American B-17 Fortresses dropped 
500-pound bombs on frozen lakes to see If such 
tactics would disrupt travel across the ice. Even 
allowing for the limited number of aircraft, the 
results were not encouraging; the bombs made 
relatively smal l holes wi thou t buck l ing the 
surface; heavy vehicles could still be supported 
by the ice. Another American experiment during 
"Eskimo" seemed more promising; a Dakota was 
used on February 1st to lay two and then four 
miles of telephone wires; on 4 February nine miles 
of wires were laid by this method through swamp 
and b u s h land. 
On 3 February, Lac la Ronge was "liberated." 
However, i t w a s a s s u m e d t h a t t he e n e m y 
continued to reinforce vigorously, necessitating 
a "fighting retreat" which began on 10 February 
and concluded on the 20th. "Eskimo" wound up 
wi th a m a r c h p a s t before Br igadier G.A.H. 
Trudeau in Prince Albert on 25 February; eight 
aircraft, led by a Dakota, performed a flypast. 
On that day the force came as close as it ever 
would to encountering a real enemy; an aircraft 
was despatched to Porcupine Plains to retrieve 
the remains of a Japanese incendiary balloon 
discovered there. 
Exercise "Polar Bear" 
"Eskimo" h a d been a r r anged to tes t "dry 
cold" effects on m e n a n d materiel; a 
comparable trial was needed under "wet cold" 
cond i t i ons (relatively h i g h e r t e m p e r a t u r e s 
where greater humidi ty and transi t ions from 
s n o w t o m u d w e r e m o r e f r e q u e n t ) . T h i s 
program, dubbed Exercise "Polar Bear," was 
held in nor the rn British Columbia in February 
and March 1945, us ing some 1,150 soldiers of 
the 6 th Division. The largest single body - 313 
officers and men - were drawn from the 1st 
B a t t a l i o n , P r i n c e A l b e r t V o l u n t e e r s , 
r epresen t ing an infantry force; this Reserve 
Army uni t h a d been mobilized in March 1942 
for service in British Columbia. The balance of 
"Polar Bear" troops were drawn from all a rms 
of t he C a n a d i a n Army, i nc lud ing medica l , 
signals, armoured, artillery, engineering and 
t ranspor t uni ts . As with "Eskimo," the largest 
group after infantry was the Royal Canad ian 
A r m y S e r v i c e C o r p s (181 al l r a n k s ) . A 
de tachment of Dakota and Norseman aircraft 
also participated.6 
"Polar Bear" proper was preceded by four 
weeks assembly and training at Wells, British 
C o l u m b i a . I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e m e n w e r e 
ins t ruc ted in snowshoeing and living in the 
open (no tents) under winter conditions. Colonel 
M.D. R o b e r t s o n (Prince Albert Volunteers ) 
commanded the force; Brigadier G.A. McCarter 
directed the exercise in all its aspects . 
As with "Eskimo," a scenario was needed 
for "Polar Bear." This one, composed in August 
1944, was an example of fanciful a s sumpt ions 
prefacing a realistic test programme: 
Action will be based on reports of a Japanese 
force having been landed at Bella Coola from 
submarines, having rendered useless RCAF 
installations at Bella Bella, and giving positive 
indication that this force is composed in great 
p a r t of c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r s o n n e l wi th a 
comparatively small protective element; the 
assumption being that it will try to construct a 
useable road from Bella Coola to permi t 
movement inland of a larger fighting force to 
follow at some later date.7 
The exercise itself was conducted in three 
overlapping phases . Between 12 February and 
5 March the force moved from Prince George to 
Anahim Lake, chiefly us ing an array of motor 
t r a n s p o r t b u t with some p a c k h o r s e s . The 
second phase r an from 4 March to early April. 
This was a series of marches from Anahim Lake 
to Bella Coola and re turn ; a secondary force of 
19 m e n spli t off from the m a i n body and , 
t r ave l l i ng b y s n o w m o b i l e a n d s n o w s h o e , 
t r aversed the Ra inbow M o u n t a i n s to Bella 
Coola; on the r e tu rn march this de tachment 
was increased to 120 m e n a n d d u b b e d "Y" 
Force. The third phase was removal of all troops 
by vehicle from Anahim Lake to Williams Lake. 
In the course of "Polar Bear" the troops fought 
three small mock bat t les (on 20 February, 11 
M a r c h a n d 1 6 March ) a g a i n s t i m a g i n a r y 
"hosti les" who were deemed to be blocking 
passage of the troops. These gave par t ic ipants 
welcome opportunit ies to fire weapons up to 
the size of a 75 mm pack howitzer. 
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Exercise "Polar Bear" (Clockwisejrom top left): Trail 
above Atnarko; Pack horse negotiating a trail through 
the mountains; The Travois method of moving artillery; 
A Consolidated Canso on Anahim Lake; Laying a 
smokescreen by air. 
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Unlike "Eskimo," which had dealt with fairly 
simple terrain (flat boreal forest), "Polar Bear" 
was conducted in a setting of complex topography 
and climate - coastal plateau and mountains , 
simple road grids to primitive trails, no snow on 
the coast bu t six feet of it in the interior. Travelling 
and living conditions varied according to whether 
the troops were moving by road or on snowshoes. 
A report described Phase I as follows: 
A typical day began with reveille at 0700 hours. 
Units moved off from 0900 on, depending on 
their order of march. During this period of at 
least two hours, men dressed, ate their meals 
(prepared at kitchens and brought back to group 
fires for reheating), broke camp and loaded 
vehicles. Halts were frequent due occasionally 
to road trouble, but generally to allow the 
Reconnaissance Troop to complete a bound and 
establish a section of the route as clear. During 
these halts, men in trucks and jeeps were able 
to get out and move around. Lunch consisted 
of cold sandwiches and occasionally hot meals 
or drinks serviced from the unit kitchen trucks. 
Halt was generally made from 1500 to 1700 
hours. Troops then made their bivouacs using 
signal tents (4-man) or 6-man tents, cut 
firewood, ate supper, and established 
themselves for the night. 
The routine in the second phase was much 
more a r d u o u s , a l though ve te rans of winter 
battles and even modern exercises might find it 
less t han demanding (most of the troops were 
conscripts). A typical marching day began at 0600 
hours , with scouts moving out at 0745 hours 
and the main body starting 15 minutes later. 
Most soldiers carried s tandard infantry weapons 
a n d a 4 5 - p o u n d p a c k of food, m e s s i n g 
equ ipmen t , socks , etc . A day 's m a r c h w a s 
approximately 14 miles; the routine consisted of 
a 20-25 minute movement followed by five to ten 
minutes rest before resuming the march. 
Supporting "Polar Bear" was a small RCAF 
detachment directed by Wing Commander R.I. 
Thomas, AFC. As a photo survey pilot in the 
1930s, he had gained experience in frontier flying; 
as of 1945 he had flown roughly 2,500 hours . 
His force, headquartered at Prince George, was 
equipped with Norseman, Ventura and Dakota 
aircraft. During the exercise they operated at 
various times from Williams Lake, Vanderhoof 
and Quesnel. During the initial training phase 
the air force practised free-fall supply drops using 
boxes of ashes; the stain left on snow showed 
clearly the crews' aiming accuracy. An early 
practice bombing trial was frustrated because 
white smoke projectiles - indistinguishable from 
snowy terrain - were used. One report from the 
pre-exercise period demonstrated the efficiency 
of the aircrews a n d Thomas ' s own sense of 
humour: 
On the 27th January, a supply dropping 
exercise was carried out in conjunction with 
Army manoeuvres at Wells. No attempt was 
made to show how much could be dropped, 
stress being laid on the variety of commodities 
which could be delivered safely, and also the 
type of make-shift parachutes which could be 
devised. Eggs were the most fragile articles, and 
landed without breakage. It was reported that 
one of the A.L.O.'s [Aerial Liaison Officers] had 
to break an egg to convince sceptics that they 
were not frozen. A bell tent was used to drop 
one bundle to show how far it was possible to 
go with improvising. Unfortunately a pair of large 
ladies' bloomers failed to safeguard a bottle of 
eastern beer for Brigadier Campbell, VC, DSO.8 
The exercise tested many techniques tha t 
particularly interested the RCAF, notably snow 
compacting to establish landing strips in open 
country. Unfortunately, several tractors broke 
through lake ice while preparing such sites, and 
although no lives were lost, the retrieval of the 
vehicles proved time consuming. A series of 
supply drops from 4,000 feet, 5,000 feet and 
6,000 feet were disappoint ing; u p p e r winds 
scattered the cargo bundles . It was concluded 
that high-level drops should be conducted only 
when turbulence made it impossible to enter the 
valleys; even then, parachute openings would be 
delayed to ensure minimum dispersal. On two 
occasions a jeep was dropped by parachute . The 
first test appears to have succeeded b u t the 
second failed w h e n none of the p a r a c h u t e s 
opened fully and the vehicle was reduced to 
rubble. 
"Polar Bear" presented the air force with some 
unusua l tasks, since it was probably the last 
major army exercise to make extensive use of 
pack an ima l s . On Feb rua ry 21s t a n d 23rd 
aircraft delivered a total of 210 hay bales and 
4,400 pounds of oats to Tatla and Kleena Kleene. 
Additional feed deliveries were made in March. 
They were not wi thout incident; the aircraft 
descended into turbulent canyon air currents; 
on at least two occasions hay bales s t ruck the 
tailplanes of Dakota transports. Flight Lieutenant 
J.H.A. Lougheed was later commended for his 
role in these drops. 
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Unlike "Esk imo," however, a t t e m p t s a t 
tactical air support missions during "Polar Bear" 
were b o t h m o d e s t a n d d i s appo in t ing . The 
Venturas scouted for non-existent enemies; a 
mock strafing attack "to permit Observers to note 
the effect of .50 calibre fire on the var ious 
parapets" was cancelled due to weather and not 
rescheduled. When drafting the final report on 
"Polar Bear," staff officers wrote that "insufficient 
use was made of tactical support to justify any 
conclusions." 
"Po la r Bear , " m o r e t h a n " E s k i m o , " 
demonstrated the limits of soldiers working in 
demanding conditions. The problems were not 
t h o s e of su rv iva l b u t of e n d u r a n c e . Men 
struggling through snow and rugged terrain while 
packing or dragging their own supplies would 
not be fit to work or fight. The alternatives would 
be to provide extensive t ranspor t - wheeled, 
tracked, or pack animals (assuming the presence 
of roads or suitable vehicles) or resort to frequent 
aerial re-supply (which could not always be 
a s su red , given limits imposed by range and 
weather). 
Staff officers were writing assessments even 
before the final wrap-up. Ultimately, in the case 
of "Eskimo," they produced three volumes of 
conclusions and recommendations. The report 
on "Polar Bear" was more modest (one volume). 
The latter analysis noted that the exercise had 
been more a t e s t of m o u n t a i n t h a n winter 
warfare. Apart from technical evaluations of 
equipment, ranging from skiis and rations to 
vehicles and ammunition, both reports stressed 
the validity of long-standing principles set out in 
basic field manuals , such as the importance of 
camouflage. Both recognized the limitations of 
learning from exercises using minimal forces and 
no realistic "enemy" simulation. 
Exercise "Lemming" 
Even before the conclusion of these two exercises, the Army had decided to following 
through on "Eskimo" by conducting a smaller 
tactical scheme under more northern conditions. 
The Chief of the General Staff wrote to the 
Minister of National Defence on 15 February 
1945, outlining a test of oversnow vehicles on 
the Barren Grounds and sea ice. One striking 
difference between this and the earlier exercises 
36 
was that it would have a civil as well as a military 
appl ica t ion. The D e p a r t m e n t of Mines a n d 
Resources was contemplating the use of such 
vehicles to supply survey parties on Victoria and 
Banks Is lands in the winter of 1945-46, in 
contemplation of ground control of subsequent 
nor thern aerial surveys.9 
Exercise "Lemming" (22 March to 6 April 
1945) involved a convoy of six vehicles (two 
Canadian Armoured Snowmobiles Mk.I, two M29 
cargo carriers, two M7 snow tractors plus ten 
army sledges and two Inuit-type sleds) moving 
from Churchill, Manitoba to Padlei, Northwest 
Territories and return, a round-trip distance of 
653 miles. No fictitious combat scenario was 
composed for this . Its s ta ted objectives were 
limited b u t realistic, namely: 
(a) To obtain Information of a non-tactical 
nature by which to extend Canadian Army 
winter doctrine from sub-Arctic conditions. 
(b) To provide data upon which to base further 
development of oversnow vehicles. 
(c) To explore the barren grounds, as an area 
for further winter exercises. 
(d) To assist civil development and surveys in 
the barren grounds. 
Arctic warfare, it was realized, would differ greatly 
from winter warfare. The latter, however harsh , 
involved movement along existing roads or close 
to railheads. Arctic warfare, on the other hand, 
would be in vast spaces where uni ts would eitiier 
have to be self-contained or constantly supplied 
by air. Inves t iga t ing the l imits of t he self-
contained column, "Lemming" involved a modest 
force - only 17 officers, other ranks, and civilian 
observers (plus one American Army observer); of 
these, five remained at Churchill in support roles. 
It was directed by a very experienced officer, Major 
P.D. Baird, RCA, who had civil experience in the 
Arctic, had attended Mountain Warfare Schools 
in Iceland, Scot land, a n d Alberta, a n d h a d 
participated as an observer in "Polar Bear." He 
had been pulled from that operation to at tend 
"Eskimo" and draw up a plan for "Lemming"; 
mos t of h i s a s soc i a t e s h a d pa r t i c ipa t ed in 
"Eskimo"; Mr. R.J. Kerr had been involved in 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e C a n a d i a n A r m o u r e d 
Snowmobile. 
The party left Churchill on 22 March 1945, 
reached Eskimo Point on the 25th, and departed 
8
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 2, Art. 4
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss2/4
Above: Lieutenant-Colonel P.D. Baird, experienced 
in Arctic operations and mountain warfare, took part 
in Exercises "Eskimo," "Polar Bear" and "Lemming." 
The photos contained in this article all came from 
the Peter Baird Collection at the National Archives 
of Canada. 
Exercise "Lemming": Assorted vehicles on sea ice 
near Churchill, MB (above), and mounting a pressure 
ridge (below). 
for Padlei on the 27 th . They r eached their 
dest inat ion late the following day. The r e tu rn 
journey commenced at 0715 hours on the 30th; 
more t h a n 15 hou r s later they reached Eskimo 
Po in t . Two d a y s w e r e s p e n t r e s t i n g a n d 
repairing vehicles. The convoy set out again on 
2 April a n d reached Churchill early on the 6th. 
The official report of "Lemming" suggests 
t o a m o d e r n r e a d e r t h a t t h e e x e r c i s e 
demonst ra ted the difficulties of Barrens travel 
wi thout m u c h hope of future improvement . 
Vi r tua l ly every day w a s m a r k e d by s o m e 
p r o b l e m - s t u c k v e h i c l e s , s t r i p p e d 
t ransmiss ions , failed radio communica t ions , 
excessive fuel consumption. Time was lost in 
frustrating ways. On 24 March, for example, 
the convoy wasted several h o u r s th rough a 
navigation problem which Baird described: 
Lush's cabin on Big River was the objective for 
this afternoon and to the east north west from 
this point a square object which was thought 
to be this was seen. After travelling seven miles 
overland and within one hundred yards of the 
object it was found to be a large rock exactly 
the shape and size of a cabin.10 
The party camped in the open tha t night 
and did not find the elusive cabin until the next 
day; they est imated they h a d driven seventeen 
unnecessary miles. Baird, nevertheless, was an 
e n t h u s i a s t , de t e rmined to a rgue tha t , with 
technical improvements , the a rmy would be 
able to move freely in the Barrens . His report 
was striking in the confidence with which he 
expressed his conclusions: 
The exercise proved that travel over the Barren 
Grounds and coastal sea ice in oversnow 
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vehicles is not difficult...The exercise proved 
that the inaccessibility of the Arctic is jus t 
another myth and, providing supplies are 
assured, operations on the barren grounds 
which represent one third of Canada's area can 
be as unhindered as operations on the Libyan 
deserts. It would therefore seem desirable that 
for defence purposes Canada should develop 
further oversnow vehicle types and t ra in 
personnel to operate in these regions.11 
Balrd would soon have an opportunity to test 
his views on a larger scale. Six months latei 
the Canadian government authorized Exercise 
"Musk Ox," accompanied by unprecedented 
publicity which would re-focus Canadian 
attention on the north. But that, as they say, is 
another story. 
9. See note 2. 
10. Canadian Army Operational Research Group Report 
No.25 - Exercise Lemming, dated 24 May 1945; 
(uncatalogued document held in Canadian War 
Museum Library, Vimy House); also filed with DHH as 
document 746.083 (D.19). This report refers to the 
earlier exercise, Polar Bear; several of the vehicles used 
in Lemming had been driven in Polar Bear. 
11. Ibid.; see also Canadian Army file RS-4-17-2 "Cold 
Weather Exercises - Policy," held by Canadian Armed 
Forces, DHH (168.009 D.13). 
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Canadians who have been awarded the 
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Notes 
1. Winter Warfare Research Programme 
1944-1945 -Exercise Eskimo (Dry Cold), 
Directorate of History and Heritage 
(DHH), document 746.013 D.2 
2. DND file ARMS 10-11, "Winter Trials and 
Test Exercises 1944-45," preserved as 
DHH document 314.009 D.179 
3. Ibid., Murchie to Minister of National 
Defence, 27 July 1944, minuted by 
Ralston on 31 July 1944; see also DND 
file RS 4-17-1, "Cold Weather Exercises," 
held by DHH as document 168.009 
(D.13). 
4. Canadian Army file 4-17-1 "Cold 
Weather Exercises - Policy," held by 
Canadian Armed Forces DHH 
(Document 168.009 D.13); Canadian 
Army and RCAF Winter Warfare 
Programme, 1944-45: Exercise Eskimo 
(see note 1). 
5. Diary of RCAF Army Co-Operation Unit, 
Prince Albert, held in National Archives 
of Canada (microfilm C-12396). 
6. Unless otherwise stated, information on 
Polar Bear is drawn from Canadian Army 
Operational Research Group Report 
No.28: Exercise POLAR Bear (DHH 
document 746.083 (D.20). 
7. "Exercise Polar Bear - Description of 
Operation," found in Volume Three of 
Canadian Army flle619-l-12 "Training: 
Combined Operations," filed with DHH 
as document 169.012 (D.35). 
8. DHH document 746.009 (D.2), Weekly 
Progress Reports of "Polar Bear," RCAF 
Detachment. Unless otherwise noted, 
this is the source of all information on 
the RCAF's role in Polar Bear. 
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